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Abstract
In three Experiments, (N = 48 3- to 4-year olds; 100 3- to 5-year olds; 54 4-year-
olds), children who could see or feel a target toy, recognized when they had sufficient
information to answer “Which one is it?” and when they needed additional access. They
were weaker at taking the informative modality of access when the choice was between
seeing more of a partially visible toy and feeling it; at doing so when the target was
completely hidden; and at reporting seeing or feeling as their source of knowledge of the
target’s identity having experienced both. Working understanding of the knowledge
gained from seeing and feeling (identifying the target efficiently) was not necessarily in
advance of explicit understanding (reporting the informative source).
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Children’s Working Understanding of the Knowledge Gained from Seeing and Feeling
How efficiently and effectively do young children find out about objects’
properties? Do they, for example, spontaneously feel an object to find out whether it is
hard or soft? The published literature does not tell us. Although it is well documented that
young children suffer from limited reflective understanding of the connection between
information access and consequent knowledge state, we do not know how far such
limitations are reflected in their knowledge-seeking behavior. The research reported here
was designed to find out.
Children’s tendency to over-estimate their knowledge and underestimate the
uncertainty arising from limited information, is reported in two distinct literatures. First,
research on children’s understanding of ambiguity and undecidability shows that children
younger than 7 or 8 years tend to: Make a single interpretation of information that affords
more than one interpretation; judge that they know the true interpretation when a
judgement of “don't know” would be appropriate; and judge that limited input tells or
shows them or another person enough to identify the target. By around 7 to 8 years, in
contrast, many children demonstrate in various ways and across a range of tasks, that they
are aware that input can be ambiguous, that a perceiver could make the wrong
interpretation or would not know the correct interpretation, and that two perceivers might
legitimately make different interpretations (e.g. Braine & Rumaine, 1983; Carpendale &
Chandler, 1996; Chandler & Helm, 1984; Klahr & Chen, 2003; Pieraut-le-Bonniec, 1980;
Robinson & Robinson, 1982; Robinson, Thomas, Parton & Nye, 1997; Taylor, 1988).
In the tasks cited in the preceding paragraph, children gained incomplete
knowledge about a target object via a single modality, such as seeing a partially obscured
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object, when they needed to see more of it to be sure of identifying it accurately. A
second relevant body of literature examines children’s understanding about knowledge
gained from different modalities such as seeing or feeling. Although 3-year-olds
differentiate epistemic from non-epistemic access (Pillow, 1993), 4- and 5-year-olds still
have incomplete understanding of the specific knowledge to be gained from a particular
modality of input such as seeing or feeling (O’Neill, Astington & Flavell, 1992; O’Neill
& Chong, 2001; Pillow, 1993). Children are also poor at reporting the source of
knowledge just gained, for example by seeing or feeling (Gopnik & Graf, 1988; Wimmer,
Hogrefe & Perner, 1988). O’Neill and Chong (2001) give a memorable account of errors
made: “To watch a child sniffing a swimming pool and tell you that is how they found
out it contained cold water is quite striking!” (pp812-813).
Presumably the research summarized above is of interest at least in part because it
is assumed to have implications for children’s everyday life. The findings raise the
possibility that children aged 3- to 5- years are inefficient, ineffective and inaccurate at
finding out about the physical world. It seems plausible that many young children assume
they know whether a particular food tastes nice or nasty just by looking at it, but then so
might many adults. Perhaps less plausible is that on opening the fridge and glimpsing a
small part of an opaque milk carton, young children act as if they know whether it is full
or empty, for example by announcing “We need more milk!” If such behaviour is not in
evidence, why are children’s responses inappropriate in the experiments cited above?
One obvious explanation is that in the tasks cited, children were required to reflect
and comment on the knowing process rather than merely gain knowledge: For example
they were expected to report the source of knowledge just gained, or to judge what they
or another protagonist knew. We have little evidence about the working understanding
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children reveal when they simply find out about objects in the physical world rather than
reflect on how to find out or what they know from particular access.
It is important to gather such evidence not just because of its potential relevance
to our understanding of children’s everyday learning about the world, but also because it
is potentially relevant to a developmental account of the more reflective understanding
heavily studied so far. One possibility is that researchers can infer understanding about
the process of gaining knowledge in the pattern of children’s behavior, well before their
verbally explicit comments on the knowing process reveal that same understanding. In
other domains of knowledge this can be the case. For example, children’s direction of
gaze or their impulsive grasping imply understanding of a protagonist’s false belief at a
much younger age than their more reflective pointing or their verbal response (Clements
& Perner, 1994; Garnham & Perner, 2001). Similarly, children’s spontaneous gestures
when solving an arithmetic problem can reveal more advanced understanding than their
verbally explicit comments about how to solve it (Goldin-Meadow, 2006).
Theoretical accounts of cognitive development such as those by Karmiloff-Smith
(1992) and Dienes and Perner (1999) propose that development within any domain of
understanding can proceed from an implicit, procedural level through increasingly
explicit, reflective and declarative levels. A different but related distinction, between
cognitive and metacognitive understanding in any domain (e.g. Flavell & Wellman, 1977;
Schneider & Sodian, 1988) is also useful for capturing the essential difference between
finding out about the world and knowing how to find out.
Within both these theoretical approaches (implicit vs explicit understanding;
cognition vs metacognition), a question of interest is how effectively children can behave
with or without the benefit of reflective understanding. For example, when inferring a
protagonist’s belief, Dienes and Perner (1999) argue that implicit understanding relies on
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abstraction of behavioral regularities. Until children achieve “genuine causal
understanding of the underlying processes,” evidenced by explicit understanding (p749),
these authors argue, they are severely limited in their ability to track mental states.
Similarly, within the domain of oral communication skills, although young children
manage reasonably well as listeners and speakers without explicit understanding about
the causes of communicative success and failure, once such understanding is achieved,
their behavior as speakers and listeners shows greater appropriate flexibility (Robinson &
Robinson, 1983). One implication is that even if children’s finding out behavior is in
advance of their ability to comment on the knowing process, we might find serious
limitations in the former until the latter is in evidence.
We posed two broad research questions: First, how efficiently do young children
use seeing and feeling to identify target objects? We examined this by providing children
initially with either informative, uninformative, or no access to a target toy. For example,
they could see a toy that was identified by color, or they could feel it, or it was
completely hidden. We observed whether they spontaneously sought further information
only when it was necessary, and whether they then took the informative modality of
access if there was a choice.
Second, how does children’s knowledge-seeking behavior relate to their ability to
report on how they found out? One possibility is children’s spontaneous behavior when
identifying a target object reveals full command of the knowledge to be gained from
seeing and feeling before they can comment reflectively on the knowing process. An
alternative possibility is that children’s knowledge-seeking behavior is limited until they
achieve reflective understanding of the knowing process.
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Experiment 1
We compared children’s responses in two tasks. In one, the partial access identity
task, they saw one of a pair of toys and were asked which one it was. On some trials the
toys were identified by color, so children could answer correctly without gaining further
information. On other trials the toys were identified by feel, so children had to touch the
toy in order to be sure of answering correctly. We were interested in whether or not
children answered the question on the basis of necessary and sufficient information
access, or whether they answered on the basis of insufficient or unnecessary information,
for example without feeling a hard or soft toy, or only after feeling a toy identified by
color. In the second task, the source reporting task, children both saw and felt a toy and
were asked how they knew which one it was. Can children who efficiently identify the
target toy, also report the informative source?
Method
Participants. The sample comprised 48 children (18 boys and 30 girls; age range,
3;5 to 4;4 mean = 3;11), who attended nursery classes in a mixed working-class /
middle-class area of U.K.
Materials. We used 5 pairs of toys that either felt the same but differed in color,
for example red and blue stylised cats, and 5 pairs that looked the same but one was hard
and the other soft, for example yellow bears. A plain box was used for the warm-up trials
for the partial access identity task.
Design. Children were allocated alternately to the partial access identity task and
the source reporting task. Each task was preceded by 2 warm-up trials. The partial access
identity task included 8 experimental trials, and the source reporting task included 6. In
each task, on half the experimental trials feeling was informative and on half seeing was
informative. Eight different orders of these two trial types were cycled between children.
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Procedure. Children allocated to the partial access identity task began with two
warm-up trials designed to discourage children from guessing a toy’s identity. On each
warm-up trial, a pair of toys was introduced and children agreed on their properties. The
Experimenter (S. Haigh) hid one of the toys in the plain box, and asked the child “Which
one is inside?” Children who guessed without opening the box were told “Don’t guess,
you can find out which one it is”, followed by prompts if necessary.
Eight experimental trials followed. Each began with children agreeing that the
toys in a pair looked (or felt) the same but felt (or looked) different. The Experimenter
mixed up the toys behind his back, and then placed one on the table just out of the child’s
reach. The child was asked “Which one is it?” We noted whether children named the toy
only after leaning over to touch it, or named it before or without touching it.
Children allocated to the source reporting task received 2 warm-up trials designed
to familiarize them with the source question for seeing and feeling. The Experimenter
mixed up the toys behind his back then handed one to the child. The child was asked
which one it was, and while still holding the toy, was asked the source question, for
example, “How did you know it was the hard one?” adding prompts if necessary.
Children who answered wrongly or who failed to answer were told the correct answer.
Those who answered correctly were told, for example, “That’s right, you knew it was the
hard one because you felt it.” Six experimental trials then followed with the same format
but without feedback after the source question.
Results and Discussion
Performance in the partial access identity task. Children gained a score of 1 when
they felt the toy before identifying it. The mean score out of 4 (sd) on the feeling
informative trials was 3.29 (1.37); on the seeing informative trials it was 1.17 (1.43): t
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(23) = 5.49, p < .001. Children more frequently felt the toys when it was necessary to do
so, and more frequently identified it without feeling when seeing was sufficient.
From the above analysis, we cannot tell whether children showed any overall
tendency to touch the toy unnecessarily, or a tendency not to touch it when it was
necessary to do so. Further analysis showed neither was the case. The same data were
scored differently when seeing was informative: Children scored 1 when they identified
the toy before or without feeling it. Hence correct behavior scored 1 in both tasks. The
mean score out of 4 (sd) was 2.83 (1.43), not significantly different from the score when
feeling was informative, 3.29 (1.37). Children were no more or less likely to do nothing
when seeing was sufficient, than they were to feel when that was necessary.
Performance on source reporting task. Children gained a score of 1 when they
correctly reported the informative source. There was no difference in correct source
reports whether seeing or feeling was informative: Mean source scores out of 3 (sd) on
the see and feel trials were 1.08 (1.25) and 1.17 (1.13) respectively.
Comparison between tasks. We eliminated final seeing and feeling trials in the
partial access identity task, so that both tasks contained 3 trials when seeing was
informative and 3 when feeling was informative. Children were given a combined score
out of 6 for each task. Mean scores out of 6 (sd) for partial access identity and source
reporting tasks were 4.67 (1.37) and 2.21 (1.82) respectively: t (46) = 5.29, p < .001.
Children were better at identifying the toys on the basis of necessary and sufficient
information than they were at reporting the informative source.
To conclude, the results so far are consistent with the suggestion that children’s
working understanding of the connection between information access and knowledge
state, revealed in the pattern of their behavior, is in advance of the reflective
understanding revealed in their explicit source judgements.
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Experiment 2
The results so far relate only to recognition of informative and uninformative
access: In the identity task children had only to recognize whether or not they had
sufficient information to identify the target, and in the source reporting task they had only
to recognize whether seeing or feeling had led to their knowledge of the target’s identity.
In Experiment 2 we included a no access identity task, that demanded prediction of the
knowledge to be gained from seeing or feeling. We also included a different partial
access identity task, filling in a condition missing in Experiment 1 by adding trials on
which children were initially given uninformative or informative access by feeling.
Finally, we included an older age group.
Method
Participants. We tested 50 nursery children (age range = 3,1 to 4,5; mean age =
3,11), and 50 children in their first year of formal schooling (U.K. reception class). The
age range was 4,6 to 5,6; mean age = 5;0. The children came from mixed middle to
working class backgrounds.
Design. Each child had two warm-up trials and four experimental trials, two of
these in the partial access identity task and two in the no access identity task (which also
included the source reporting question). On one trial in each task seeing was informative
and on the other, feeling was informative. The following variables were counterbalanced
between children: Order of the partial access and no access identity tasks; order of seeing
informative and the feeling informative trials; order of presentation of forced-choice
alternatives in the identity question and the source question; in the partial access task,
whether children were given initial access by seeing or feeling.
Materials. We used a tunnel with a window cut into one side, into which one of a
pair of toys could be placed. The window had a curtain that could be lifted to see what
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was inside. The open ends of the tunnel allowed children to feel what was inside. Each
trial used a different pair of toys that either looked the same but felt different, or a pair
that felt the same but differed in color. A bag was used to hide the toys in while they were
placed inside the tunnel.
Procedure. The Experimenter was J.E.C. Pendle. Two Warm-up trials gave
children practice at feeling and seeing toys inside the tunnel, and with the source
question. In the partial access identity task, children were given one mode of access to
the hidden toy, either seeing, or feeling. For children given seeing access, the curtain on
the tunnel was raised before the toy was slipped inside, allowing the toy to be identified if
color, but not if hardness, was the defining attribute. The curtain remained raised
throughout the trial. Children given feeling access were asked to place their hand inside
the tunnel, and could therefore feel the toy when it was placed inside, allowing it to be
identified if hardness, but not if color, was the defining attribute. Their arm remained in
the tunnel while the test question was asked. Children were then asked, “Now I want you
to find out whether it is the (soft dog or the hard dog) inside the tunnel.” When
informative access was given at the outset, children could answer correctly without
taking further action. When the toy was identified by hardness, children given seeing
access had to put their hand inside the tunnel. When the toy was identified by color,
children given feeling access had to raise the curtain. We were interested in whether
children identified the toy on the basis of necessary and sufficient access.
The no access task was the same for all children. They were asked which toy was
in the tunnel not having been given any initial access: At the start of each trial the curtain
was down and their hand was outside the tunnel. We were interested in whether their
initial response was to take informative access. After children had identified the toy, the
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Experimenter invited them to take the other mode of access and once they had both seen
and felt the hidden toy, the source question was asked as in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
Children were scored as correct in answer to the partial access identity question if
their final answer came after they had received or taken informative access. Children
were scored as correct in answer to the no access identity question if they spontaneously
took informative access, and only took the uninformative access when subsequently
invited to by the Experimenter. Children’s answers to the source question were scored as
correct if they reported the informative source.
Answers in the partial access identity task. Twenty-three out of 50 younger
children, and 38 out of 50 older children, responded correctly on both their trials, and the
remainder were correct on one of their two trials. There was no difference in children’s
scores in the partial access identity task according to whether they were initially given
informative or uninformative access, both when the access they were given was seeing
(when the curtain was raised at the start of the trial: 37 and 39 correct responses out of 50
respectively), and when access given was feeling (when their hand was in the tunnel at
the start of the trial: 38 and 47 correct responses out of 50). That is, they were no more or
less likely to seek additional information when that was necessary (for example, to feel a
hard or soft toy when the curtain was raised at the start of the trial) than to answer on the
basis of the access given when that was sufficient (for example, not to feel a blue or red
worm when the curtain was raised at the start of the trial).
Answers in the no access identity task. Five of the 50 younger and 18 of the 50
older children responded correctly on both trials. Ten younger and 3 older children failed
both their trials. The younger children performed no differently whether seeing or feeling
was informative. The older children showed a preference for feeling the hidden target
Understanding the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling
13
toy: Twenty-two were correct only when feeling was informative, compared with 8 who
answered correctly only when seeing was informative (binomial test, p = .016). We offer
no explanation for this. Previous findings on such preferences have been inconsistent
(O’Neill et al., 1992; O’Neill & Chong, 2001), and no such effect was found in
Experiment 3 using exactly the same task with a slightly younger age group.
Comparison between tasks. Children gained a score out of 2 for their answers to
each of the partial access identity, no access identity, and source questions. The mean
scores appear in Table 1. A 3 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted with question type (partial
access identity vs. no access identity vs. source) as a within-child variable, and age (3- to
4- years vs. 4- to 5- years) and trial order (partial access before or after no access tasks) as
between-child variables. Significant main effects were found for question type, F(1.87,
179.1) = 31.41, p < .001, partial2 = .246 (Greenhouse-Geisser correction was used
because the homogeneity of variance assumption was violated), and for age F(1, 96) =
25.80, p < .001, partial2 = .212. There were no other significant effects. For the main
effect of age, reception children performed significantly better on all trials than nursery
children. For the main effect of question type, additional multiple comparisons analysis
indicated children performed significantly better on partial access identity compared to
no access identity, and on partial access identity trials compared to source (both p <
.001).
There was no difference between performance on the no access identity and the
source questions: Children were no worse at reporting explicitly the source of their
knowledge than they were at identifying the toy in the no access task. The implication is
that children do not necessarily reveal more advanced understanding about the
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knowledge gained from seeing and feeling when they simply identify the target toy, than
when they reflect on the knowing process (source reporting).
Children found it easier to identify the target toy efficiently in the partial access
identity task than in the no access identity task. Although the older children performed
better than the younger ones in the partial access task, even the 3- to 4-year olds did well
as a group. Importantly, as in Experiment 1, in the partial access identity task children
performed just as well whether they were given informative or uninformative access:
They recognized both when they knew the toy’s identity on the basis of the information
provided, and when they did not know. We cannot yet conclude, however, that children
positively selected the informative mode of access. Perhaps, having recognized that they
had insufficient information, children simply took the only other available response
option, without necessarily understanding that this would be informative. The superior
performance on the partial access identity task over the no access identity task may be
because only in the latter did children have to imagine in advance which mode of access
would provide sufficient information to identify the toy.
Experiment 3
In Experiment 3 we found out whether children given uninformative visual
access, knew whether seeing more or feeling was necessary to identify the target toy. We
compared children’s performance on a modified version of the partial access task used in
Experiment 2, with their performance on the no access task used in Experiment 2. In the
modified partial access task, children who realised that partial visual access to the target
was uninformative had an alternative to feeling the toy: They could raise a second curtain
to see more of it, and this provided identifying information on half the experimental
trials. If this modified partial access task was easier than the no access task, we would be
able to conclude that children not only recognized when they had insufficient information
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to identify the target, but also knew what modality of access would provide the necessary
additional information. On the other hand, should we find no difference in performance
on the partial access and no access tasks in Experiment 3, we would have no grounds for
arguing that children predict the informative modality, rather than just recognize
uninformative access, in the partial access tasks in Experiments 1, 2 and 3.
Method
Participants. 54 children were tested (age range = 4,1 to 5,2; mean age 4,8). They
attended U.K. primary schools serving a mixed working class and middle class area.
Materials. For the no access identity task, materials were as in Experiment 2. For
the modified 3-option partial access identity task we used a second tunnel on which the
curtain was split vertically down the middle, giving two smaller curtains that could be
lifted, each to reveal half of the target toy. Pairs of toy dogs were used. Dogs in one pair
differed only in the color of their collar. Dogs in the other pair differed only in that one
felt hard and the other soft. When children looked behind one of the curtains they could
see only the toy’s body, and when they looked behind the other curtain they could see
only the toy’s head and collar.
Design. Each child had two warm-up and four experimental trials. Two
experimental trials used the no access identity task as in Experiment 2. The other two
experimental trials involved the new 3-option partial access identity task. In this latter
task children were given initial partial visual access that was always insufficient to
identify the target, because the dog’s collar was not visible, or because the dog was
identified by feel. The following variables were counterbalanced between children: Order
of no access and partial access tasks, order of seeing informative and feeling informative
trials, and order of presentation of the forced-choice alternatives (e.g. hard or soft toy) in
the identity question.
Understanding the knowledge gained from seeing and feeling
16
Procedure. The Experimenter was J.E.C. Pendle. The warm-up and procedure for
the no access task were as in Experiment 2, but with no source question. Immediately
before their two experimental trials in the 3-option partial access task, children had a
demonstration of the new tunnel.
Results and Discussion
Criteria for correct scores were as in Experiment 2. Nearly all the 32 errors on the
3-option partial access identity task consisted of choosing the wrong modality of
additional access. Children who answered correctly on only one out of their two trials in a
task were no more likely to answer correctly when seeing was informative or when
feeling was informative, so we combined scores out of two to compare tasks. The mean
scores (sd) were 1.26 (.62) in the no access task, and 1.41 (.53) in the partial access task.
These scores were above chance: no access task,2(2, N = 54) = 7.93, p < .05; partial
access task,2(2, N = 54) = 18.60, p < .001 (comparing the observed frequencies of
scores 0, 1, and 2 with the distribution expected by chance). Performance on the no
access and partial access tasks was compared in a 2 x 2 ANOVA with task (no vs partial
access) as a within-child variable, and trial order (no access before vs after partial access
task) as a between-child variable. No significant effects were found either for the main
effect of task, F(1, 52) = 3.00, p = .089, partial2 = .055, or the interaction of trial order
F(1, 52) = 0.31, p = .580, partial2 = .006.
Hence children were no better at predicting whether they needed to see or feel a
hidden toy when they had uninformative access to it in the 3-option task, than when they
had no access. The implication is that when children had uninformative access to the toy
in Experiments 1 and 2, some children sought appropriate additional information merely
because that was the only alternative available. For example, in Experiments 1 and 2,
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some children probably felt a toy to see if it was hard or soft, having recognized that what
they saw was insufficient but without predicting that feeling was necessary.
A further interesting finding was the lack of difference in difficulty between trials
on which children needed to see more of the target they had partially seen (within
modality ambiguity), and trials on which they needed to feel the target they had partially
seen (between modality ambiguity). The developmental relationship between children’s
handling of these two types of ambiguous input could be examined further. As mentioned
in the introduction, judgments under these two conditions have typically been examined
in distinct literatures, and understanding about aspectuality has not been treated as part of
a wider problem understanding when they have sufficient or insufficient information to
make a confident interpretation (but see Robinson, Thomas, Parton & Nye, 1997).
General Discussion and Conclusions
We can now answer the questions posed in the introduction. First, we were
interested in how efficiently young children use seeing and feeling to identify objects’
properties. Children performed relatively well in the partial access identity tasks in
Experiments 1 and 2: They generally recognized when they had been given informative
access, and when they had not, they generally took the only other available mode of
access. In contrast, performance was much poorer in the no access tasks in Experiments 2
and 3, and in the 3-option partial access task in Experiment 3, when children had to
predict whether seeing or feeling would allow them to identify the target. Children who
recognized that they needed more information did not necessarily know what information
they needed.
Second, we were interested in how children’s knowledge-seeking behavior related
to their ability to report on how they found out. One possibility was children’s behavior
when identifying a target object would reveal full command of the knowledge to be
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gained from seeing and feeling before they could comment on the knowing process. This
was not the case. Our results suggest that initially, working understanding about sources
of knowledge is limited to recognition of sufficient and insufficient access. Children’s
working understanding extends to being able to predict the knowledge to be gained from
particular modes of access only when, and possibly because, explicit understanding is
achieved.
Within a framework of cognition vs metacognition, the ability to reflect on the
knowing process might be expected to bring advantages in terms of more efficient or
effective knowledge-gaining behaviour. As yet we have no evidence of direction of
causality or even of causal connection, but this framework may prove more useful for
future work than one of levels of implicit or explicit understanding, since placing our
tasks on a dimension of implicit vs explicit understanding is not straightforward. The
source question “How do you know” is uncontroversially a test of verbally explicit,
reflective understanding. Similarly, children’s immediate responses to “Which one is it?”
in the partial access identity task of Experiment 1, seem uncontroversially to assess
implicit understanding. The difficulty arises with the other tests of working
understanding. The no access prediction task (and by inference Experiment 3’s partial
access task) was no easier than the explicit source question. We might conclude,
therefore, that they demand similar levels of reflective understanding about the knowing
process. If so we would need to differentiate the partial access task in Experiment 1 from
at least some of the other finding out tasks, in terms of the level of understanding
required. Yet it seems difficult to draw a line conceptually between reaching to touch a
visible toy on the table (Experiment 1), inserting a hand inside the tunnel to touch a
visible or partially visible toy (Experiments 2 and 3), and inserting a hand inside the
tunnel to touch an invisible toy (Experiments 2 and 3). All these tasks seem to be in clear
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contrast to the source reporting task, and to O’Neill et al’s (1992) task in which children
announced how they would find out which toy was in the tunnel. That is, with the
hindsight of our results, the a priori classification of tasks as tests of working vs
reflective understanding seems to map more easily onto a cognitive vs metacognitive
framework than onto one of levels of implicit vs explicit understanding.
What do our results tell us about how effectively children learn about objects in
their everyday lives? It might have been that 3- to 4-year-olds require correction from
others, and that when operating autonomously they over-estimate the knowledge they can
gain from ambiguous input. Our results suggest that correction from others may not be
necessary. Even if children initially take uninformative access, for example by looking at
an opaque milk carton to find out how full it is, the results of the partial access identity
tasks suggest they are likely to self-correct: As soon as they see the carton they will
realize that more information is needed. Initially they may be unable to predict precisely
what mode of access is necessary, but will continue to explore until they recognize that
they have sufficient information. Our results suggest that 3- to 4-year-old children’s
working understanding of the connection between information access and knowledge
state, even if limited, allows them to find out accurately about objects’ properties despite
their well documented limitations in more reflective understanding.
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Note. Maximum score = 2.
